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ABSTRACT 
The Malaysian Government has created smart national identity card named MyKad for 
every citizen aged 12 and above since September, 2001. In the following year, the 
National Registration Department of Malaysia (JPN) has embedded the latest 
application of MyKad, which is known as Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). It allows 
secure electronic transactions over the Internet. The electronic transactions include 
online submission of tax returns, secure email and e-commerce. In parallel with the 
emergence of e-commerce payment system, a new MyKad Payment Model (MPM) is 
proposed in order to introduce to the public another function of MyKad that is not only 
for identification purposes, but also in e-commerce transactions.  However, to make this 
payment model accepted by the public, the focus should be made on two issues; 
trust/security issue and performance issue. A system with security technique named 
Arbitrary Random Security Algorithm (ARSA) and a one-to-one multithreading model 
need to be developed in order to accelerate the authentication response time of MPM. 
ARSA will automatically change its security algorithm based on times and attacks. If 
there is no attack or intrusion detected, MPM will wait for the scheduled switching 
within 30 minutes. However, if attack or intrusion is detected in less than 30 minutes, 
ARSA will automatically change the security algorithm to a new one. The 
evaluation of the MPM performance is measured with HP LoadRunner testing 
tools from which it is found that the response time of MPM with multithreading 
is better compared to the single thread model and credit card authorisation 
system. Moreover, the development of ARSA makes this model more secure and 
safer for the customers.  
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ABSTRAK 
Kerajaan Malaysia telah memperkenalkan kad pengenalan diri pintar untuk semua 
warganegaranya yang berumur 12 tahun dan ke atas sejak September 2001. Pada 
tahun berikutnya pula, Jabatan Pendaftaran Negara Malaysia (JPN) telah 
melancarkan aplikasi terbaharu MyKad yang dikenali sebagai Infrastruktur Kekunci 
Awam (PKI). Aplikasi terbaharu ini membolehkan pengguna melakukan transaksi 
elektronik dengan menggunakan kemudahan Internet. Transaksi yang dimaksudkan 
adalah seperti penghantaran borang cukai pendapatan dalam talian, emel yang 
selamat dan e-dagang. Seiring dengan perkembangan e-dagang kini, Model 
Pembayaran MyKad (MPM) yang baharu dicadangkan untuk diperkenalkan kepada 
masyarakat umum bahawa MyKad bukan sekadar digunakan untuk tujuan 
pengenalan diri tetapi juga untuk transaksi e-dagang. Walau bagaimanapun, untuk 
membolehkan model ini diterima pakai oleh rakyat Malaysia, terdapat dua isu yang 
perlu difokuskan iaitu isu kebolehpercayaan/keselamatan dan isu prestasi. Oleh itu, 
satu sistem yang menggunakan teknik keselamatan yang dinamakan sebagai 
Arbitrary Random Switching Algorithm (ARSA) dan model multijalur satu-dengan-
satu perlu dibina untuk mempercepat tempoh respon untuk transaksi MPM. ARSA 
akan menukar algoritmanya secara automatik mengikut masa dan serangan. Jika 
tiada sebarangan gangguan atau serangan dikesan, MPM akan menunggu proses 
penukaran yang dijadualkan dalam masa 30 minit. Namun, jika gangguan atau 
serangan dikesan dalam tempoh kurang daripada 30 minit, ARSA akan menukar 
algoritma keselamatan yang baharu secara automatik. Prestasi tempoh transaksi 
MPM dinilai dengan menggunakan perisian HP LoadRunner dan didapati sistem 
MPM mempunyai tempoh transaksi yang lebih cepat berbanding model jalur tunggal 
dan sistem pengesahan kad kredit. Tambahan pula, ARSA membolehkan sistem ini 
digunakan oleh pengguna dengan lebih selamat dan terjamin.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of Study 
A lot of changes had occurred in the development of smart card since it started to be 
patented in early 1970’s.  It started with a magnetic stripe card to the latest version, 
contactless smart card.  Until now, smart cards have been used to store small amount 
of money, as a debit card to pay telephone bills, photocopy, pay transportation to 
tickets and many more.  After the launch of the smart-based Subscriber Identity 
Module (SIM) card in the Europe in 1990’s, the use of this card has finally made 
sense to the public.  This smart-based SIM card is used in Global System for Mobile 
(GSM) for mobile phones in the European countries (Henry, 2007).  Smart card is 
widely used as an identification card in several countries such as Germany, South 
Korea and Malaysia.  A lot of information can be encoded in the chip card such as 
health status, driving license, insurance and other important details about oneself. 
 The Malaysian Government has used smart card as identification card for 
Malaysian and permanent residents aged 12 and above since its official launching on 
the 5th September 2001.  It incorporates an ATMEL 64K Electrically Erasable and 
Programmable Read Only Memory (EEPROM) microchip.  This chip contains 
several items of data including biometrics.  The Malaysian Government 
Multipurpose Card or also known as MyKad is a multipurpose card that enables its 
user to access public and private services.  It is regarded as the world’s first smart 
identity card (Knight, 2001).  
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According to the National Information Technology Council (NITC) (2009), 
the objective of MyKad is to provide a secure ID platform for private and 
Government transactions.  To date, MyKad project has attracted many private 
applications but the uptake of public applications has been minimal.  The council 
also reported that roughly RM900 million has been invested in MyKad project, 
including RM600 million for the purchase of 22 million smartcards.  In order to 
ensure that MyKad application achieves its full potential, various agencies such as 
Malaysia Administrative Modernisation and Management Planning Unit (MAMPU), 
National Registration Department (JPN), Pos Malaysia Berhad and NITC itself are 
required to cooperate. After spending such an amount on developing the project, the 
use of MyKad is not limited to identification purpose only, but it is also developed to 
perform different access to Government agencies.  Figure 1.1 presents the 
information contained in the chip of MyKad. 
Based on the figure, there are about eight more applications that can be 
carried out by using MyKad.  The applications include driving license information, 
passport information, health information, frequency traveller card, Automated Teller 
Machine (ATM) application, Malaysian Electronic Payment System (MEPS) cash 
(MEPSCASH), Touch ‘n Go and the latest one, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).  For 
the driving license application, MyKad replaces the paper-based laminated cards and 
functions as a regular driving license.  The users for this application are the Road 
Transportation Department (JPJ) enforcement officers and the Police Traffic Officers 
of the Royal Malaysian Police (PDRM).  The passport application in MyKad 
supplements Malaysians to facilitate efficient exit and re-entry from Malaysian 
Immigration check points.  Health information in MyKad stores basic and critical 
medical information.  Another application in MyKad, MEPSCASH facilitates 
payment of small purchases and enhances the efficiency and quality of public and 
payment services.  For transportation, MyKad can be used for the payment at the toll 
gates, parking fees, bus and Light Rail Transit (LRT) fares.  For banking application, 
MyKad provides easy and convenient transaction that acts like an ATM card.  The 
functions include cash withdrawal, balance inquiry, and fund transfer.  Finally, the 
latest application implemented, PKI provides confidentiality, integrity, non-
repudiation and authentication. 
Out of eight applications mentioned earlier, by far, the application that is 
emphasised in this research is the PKI application.  PKI enables the users to conduct 
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secure electronic commerce and transactions using digital certificate over the 
networks such as the Internet.  The authenticity and integrity of the data are protected 
and inaccessible to anyone, except from the relevant Government agencies and the 
owner of MyKad (Clarke, 2005).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Allocated Space for Various Applications in MyKad chip (JPN, 2007) 
Currently, MyKad’s PKI application allows secure electronic transactions 
over the Internet.  The transactions include online submission of tax returns, secure 
email and electronic commerce.  Based on JPN’s website, there are three agencies 
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that use PKI application but not in MyKad.  They are e-Perolehan system by the 
Ministry of Finance (MoF), e-filling system by The Inland Revenue Board of 
Malaysia (LHDN), and e-business card and tender registration by the Malaysian 
Institute of Microelectronic Systems (MIMOS).  As presented by Wan Ibrahim 
(2005), the use of MyKad’s PKI needs to be a mandatory application in five years to 
ensure the implementation of MyKad can achieve its Return on Investment (ROI). 
However, only National Identity Card (NIC) application is loaded into MyKad by 
default while other applications are loaded voluntarily (Loo et al., 2009).  The 
Government faces difficulties in convincing all MyKad users to acknowledge 
MyKad’s full potential and capabilities.  Therefore, this research aims to close the 
gap and to propose that the MyKad’s PKI to be embedded in e-commerce 
application. 
1.2  Problem Statement 
Nowadays, the Internet helps and facilitates online business to be more flexible.  
With the pressure from the fluctuated economic growth, Malaysians are turning more 
towards the online business.  This kind of business is beneficial to both merchants 
and consumers as the company needs low cost to build its business while the 
customers can easily deal with the company.  There are, however, a number of 
problems with the current online business model.  According to a survey by Rahman 
and Masrom (2010), these online business systems do not provide legal binding 
proof of the business transaction.  Normally, consumers are asked to bank the 
required amount of money for the item they want to buy.  However, there is no legal 
evidence that the money transferred to the merchant’s account is a payment for that 
particular item.  Hence, there is no way for the customers to prove that they have 
made the payment in accordance to any electronic order form prior to the transaction.  
In addition, since the transferred money is in the merchant’s account, it is not 
guaranteed that the merchant will ship the product to the consumer.  Based on these 
situations, the customers are likely not to make the purchase as they do not will to 
risk losing their money.  
5 
 
Therefore, this research proposes a new payment model that is suitable and 
acceptable in Malaysia.  In order to overcome the issues mentioned earlier, MyKad 
will be used as the medium of payment since the PKI in MyKad is recognised by the 
authority as legally bonded.  Besides, this research introduces to the public another 
use of MyKad that is not only for identification purpose but also in e-commerce 
transactions.  Hence, the new payment model will introduce to the Malaysians the 
secure usability of PKI application in MyKad that can be used as an alternative 
payment method.  In order to make this payment model acceptable by the public, the 
proposed model needs to overcome these issues:  
(a)   Trust and Security issues 
Trust has been found to have an influence on a customer’s willingness to purchase 
online (Gefen et al., 2006). For example, an entity can be said to trust a second entity 
when the first entity makes the assumption that the second entity will perform 
exactly as the first entity expects. In this proposed research, the use of PKI will gain 
the trust from the public because if anything happens during the transaction, the 
evidence generated from the PKI is admissible in the court of law since it is 
recognised as legally bonded. With the PKI, the public will find that their transaction 
and money are secure even if something happens during the transaction.  
Other than the trust issue, security has always been considered as an essential 
and critical area of research (Rahman and Masrom, 2010).  It is crucial for a payment 
model to have its own security framework.  This research intends to propose the 
security of payment model for financial transaction using MyKad.  
(b)   Performance issue 
In this issue, it emphasises on real-time performance especially regarding 
authentication response time because it can affect the users’ behaviour whether they 
want to use the system or not due to its performance.  For example, in a credit card 
system during peak hours, credit card transaction takes longer time for authorisation 
process.  The performance of the system is affected whenever the authorisation 
process is increasing.  Hence, users will try to avoid using the system during the peak 
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time. However, Siti Hafizah et al. (2008) proposed a credit card authorisation system 
using multithreading technique to improve its response time since modern operating 
systems with advanced multi-core processors have a good support of multithreading 
implementation.  Based on the comparison between single and multithread using the 
proposed system, the performance of the multithread system has increased almost 
two-fold than the single thread system.  It proves that multithreading can give better 
response time to the users and also allows users to execute the tasks simultaneously 
while running the process. 
1.3 Research Questions 
From the earlier discussion, research questions have been formulated as follows: 
(i) What are the elements involved in MyKad payment model? 
(ii)   What security frameworks can MyKad payment model implement to   
  secure customers during transaction? 
(iii) Does the new payment model with security and multithreading 
technique perform better than the credit card? 
1.4  Research Objectives 
Based on the research background and other related issues, the objectives of this 
research are as follows: 
 
(i) To identify all the elements of the payment model related to MyKad 
based on the study of payment model.  
(ii) To design a payment model with security and multithreading 
technique as proposed in the research. 
(iii) To evaluate the model based on response time of the transaction with 
the proposed techniques. 
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1.5 Research Hypothesis 
In order to determine whether the new payment model named MyKad Payment 
Model (MPM) performs as good as the credit card system, the following null 
hypothesis was tested.  
Null Hypothesis 1. There is no difference between MyKad Payment Model (MPM) 
and credit card authorisation system response time. 
1.6  Thesis Outline 
(i) Chapter 1 presents a brief explanation about the background, research 
problem statements, research questions, research objectives and research 
hypothesis.  
(ii) Chapter 2 discusses an overview of smart card, MyKad and their 
applications.  Related payment models are compared in this chapter in order 
to identify the players involved in a transaction for a basic model. Besides 
that, this chapter discusses a general idea on security and multithreading 
parts.  
(iii) Chapter 3 starts with the introduction of the basic payment model and 
followed by the details of the proposed model.  The chapter continues by 
describing how the model has been formulated and designed. It also discusses 
the two techniques proposed, which are ARSA and multithreading.   
(iv) Chapter 4 describes the details of MPM model along with its module, 
techniques proposed, architecture design of the proposed model and its 
prototype with detailed explanation on the system architecture. In the last 
section in the chapter, the performance testing of the MPM is conducted by 
using HP Load Runner.   
(v) Chapter 5 summarizes the analyses and findings of the MPM. The findings 
discussed in this section are the multithreading result. The response time 
between the proposed technique, multithread and single thread are compared 
in seconds (sec). MPM multithreading results are compared with credit card 
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authorisation system to give some insights regarding MPM performance 
compared to credit card authorisation system. 
(vi) Chapter 6 summarizes the key results of the thesis and recommends the 
topics for the future work. 
 CHAPTER 2 
ELECTRONIC PAYMENT MODEL – DATA SECURITY AND 
PERFORMANCE 
2.1 Introduction 
MyKad contains multiple applications for users’ convenience, with the latest one is 
Public Key Infrastructure or PKI in short.  As it is PKI-ready, MyKad is capable to 
store digital certificate that can be used to digitally sign and encrypt Internet 
transactions. Based on its security features, MyKad gives more secure and protected 
e-commerce transactions where it can be used as a medium of payment in purchasing 
everyday items.  In order to develop a new security payment model for MyKad 
named MyKad Payment Model (MPM), four types of payment model are discussed 
in this chapter, which are: 
 
(i) Electronic Credit Card 
(ii) Electronic Cash 
(iii) Electronic Check 
(iv) Smart Card Payment 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the issues on security and performance will be 
focused.  In security issue, several algorithms will be discussed in this chapter in 
order to find the suitable algorithm to be put in the model.  The algorithms include 
the encryption/decryption and hashing process. The performance of MPM is 
determined on how the MPM would react to the time taken for authentication process 
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for MyKad transaction.  Therefore, multithreading technique will be used instead of 
single threading.  
2.2 Smart Card 
Smart card is an intelligent card with a built-in chip capable of storing information in 
its memory (Awad, 2007).  The card contains a programmable chip, a combination of 
RAM and ROM storages and an operating system.  Turban and McElroy (1998) 
identified two main categories of smart cards.  The first category of smart card is a 
memory card that contains only non-volatile memory storage components, and 
perhaps some specific security logic.  For example, the users can spend this type of 
smart card on pay phone, retail, vending machines and other related transactions.  
The second category is a microprocessor or intelligent card that contains volatile 
memory and microprocessor components.  Most of the intelligent cards offer read 
and write applications, and new information can be added and processed (Turban and 
McElroy, 1998; and Maher, 2004). 
Since smart cards have been around for about 20 years, the demand for public 
key smart cards in the last four years has been increasing (Raihi, 2001).  The demand 
includes the Government sector, banks and insurance institutions.  The popularity of 
Internet recently also contributes to the increas of e-commerce applications and this 
will affect the growth of smart cards application in the Internet (Guthery and 
Jurgensen, 1998).  Hence, this chapter will describe more about MyKad with its 
application in e-commerce. Table 2.1 summarizes the history of smart cards. 
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Table 2.1: Summary of smart card history (Cardwerk, 2009) 
Year Inventor Description 
1968 Jurgen Dethloff & 
Helmutt Grupp 
An automated chip card, patent approved in 1982 and 
first used with France pay phones.  
1970 Dr. Kunitaka Arimura Filed the first and only patented the smart card 
concept. 
1974  Roland Moreno  Filed the original patent for the IC card, later dubbed 
the “smart card”. 
1977 Bull CP8, SGS 
Thomson, and 
Schlumberger 
Three commercial manufacturers began developing 
the IC card. 
1979  Motorola Developed the first secure single chip microcontroller 
for use in French banking. 
1982  French 
Telecommunication 
Company 
Field testing of serial memory phone cards took place 
in France, the world’s first major IC card test. 
1984  Bank Field trials of ATM bank cards with successfully 
conducted chips. 
1986  Bull CP8 Distributed smart cards to its clients such as Bank of 
Virginia, Maryland National Bank, First National 
Palm Beach Bank and Mall Bank. 
1987 U.S. Department of 
Agriculture’s 
nationwide Peanut 
Marketing Card. 
First large-scale smart card application implemented 
in the United States.  
1991 Wyoming Special 
Supplemental Nutrition 
Program for Women, 
Infants, and Children 
(WIC). 
First Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT) smart card 
project launched. 
 
 
 
1993  Telecarte (for public 
phones) 
Field test of multifunction smart card applications in 
Rennes, France, enabled in a Smart Bank Card. 
1994  Europay, MasterCard, 
and Visa (EMV) 
Published joint specifications for global microchip-
based bank cards (smart cards). 
Germany began issuance of 80 million serial memory 
chip cards as citizen health cards. 
1995  Mobile Phones 
Companies 
Mobile phone subscribers worldwide began initiating 
and billing calls with smart cards. 
 
The first of 40,000 multifunctional, multi-technology 
MARC cards with chips were issued to U.S. Marines 
in Hawaii. 
1996  Atlanta Olympics  
 
MasterCard and Visa 
Over 1.5 million VISACash stored value cards were 
issued at the Atlanta Olympics. 
MasterCard and Visa began sponsorship of 
competing consortia to work on solving the problems 
of smart card interoperability. Two different card 
solutions were developed: the JavaCard backed by 
Visa, and the Multi-Application Operating System 
(MULTOS) backed by MasterCard. 
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Table 2.1: (continued) 
 
2.3 MyKad 
MyKad is a multipurpose card that will enable Malaysians to access public and 
private services since the data stored in it include personal identification, driving 
license number, passport information, medical data and financial information.  Some 
of the services provided for MyKad holder are highway tolls, parking fees and public 
transportation such as bus fares and LRT fares.  According to Knight (2001), MyKad 
is regarded as the world’s first National Identification Smart Card.  MyKad supports 
eight types of applications such as identity card including fingerprint and photo, 
driving license, passport, e-cash, ATM card integration, Touch ‘n Go, as well as 
MyKad PKI application. 
This study is on one of the applications of Mykad, which is the Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) supported by the 64 Kb version of MyKad. It has been 
implemented since February, 2003.  With it, PKI allows easy securing of private data 
over public, thus allowing secure electronic transactions over the Internet, which 
include online submission of tax returns, Internet banking and secure email.  
However, at this moment these functions are still not widely used by Malaysian 
because they are not widely promoted and this causes the Malaysian to be unaware 
of this application. MyKad’s PKI will be explained further in next section. 
Year Inventor Description 
1998  U.S. Government’s 
General Services 
Administration 
 
United States Navy 
Microsoft 
Joined forces and implemented a nine-application 
smart card system and card management solution at 
the Smart Card Technology Center in Washington, 
D.C.  
Announced its new Windows smart card operating 
system. 
2001  Social Security IDCard,   
 Spain.                  
Full scale introduction in progress. Card gave access 
to medical benefit.  
2001 Malaysian 
Government 
Compulsory national ID scheme included 
different applications and was rolled out for 18 
million users. 
2006 Axalto and Gemplus Merged and became Gemalto. 
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2.3.1 MyKad’s PKI 
The driving force behind the security of MyKad is Virtual Environment for Secure 
Transactions (iVEST), while the PKI is developed by a subsidiary of MiMOS Bhd of 
the same name (Swinburne, 2009).  MyKad has an embedded PKI that supports 
security mechanisms such as encryption, message authentication and digital 
signatures (Phan, 2003).  The PKI in MyKad performs encryption and digital 
signatures by making use the public-key techniques.  Such techniques make use a 
pair of keys, namely a private key, which is kept secret, and a public key that is 
“widely broadcasted to the public”.  The two keys are generated such that when one 
key is used to transform some information into an unintelligible form (encryption), 
the only way to reverse the process  is by using the other key (via decryption).  
The MyKad PKI uses X.509 Version 3 (v3) certificates (Mykad Guidelines, 
2005).  The structure of the X.509 v3 certificate is illustrated in Figure 2.1.  The 
certificates contains the owner’s public key, some forms of the principal’s identity, 
algorithms used in the certificates, digitally signed and issued by Certification 
Authority (CA), and has a finite validity period (Norbik, 2006).  In particular, Figure 
2.2 shows how the certificate may be extended with optional extension fields.  These 
certificates are digitally signed using the private key of the issuing CA. A part of the 
PKI implementation focuses on MyKad physical requirements as set by the National 
Registration Department.  All registered MyKads with the identities of every 
individual shall fit for the registration and usage of the digital certificates. The 
characters of the basic requirements, but not limited to MyKad, are as follows: 
(i)   Card Operating System  
(ii)   Support international standard, ISO 7816 Part 3 and 4. 
(iii)  Cryptographic Module 
(iv)  Higher security features and accelerators. 
(v)   Secure protection of private keys 
(vi)  Digital signature support 
(vii) Minimum of RSA 1024 bits processor 
(viii) Certification 
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Figure 2.1 Certificate Format (Norbik, 2006) 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Example of Digital Certificate (Norbik, 2006) 
The implementation of PKI capabilities into MyKad along with the usage of 
Digital Certificates shall provide a few key benefits (MyKad Guideline, 2005).  
There shall be two sets of digital certificates in MyKad.  Each certificate shall have 
its own functions to be performed in accordance to Digital Signature Act 1997 and 
Digital Signature Regulations 1998.  The first set of digital certificate is used for 
digital signature and the cardholder uses the private key to carry out the function 
version (v3) 
serial number 
signature algorithm id 
issuer name 
validity period 
subject name 
subject public key info 
issuer unique identifier 
{extensions} 
Signature 
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while the second set of digital certificate is used in authentication and encryption 
function (Mykad Guidelines, 2005).  
MyKad’s PKI architecture contains security measure that involves certificate 
registration.  The process of certification creation involves a lot of encryption and 
decryption of sensitive data (SANS Institute, 2001).  The encryption and decryption 
of the data are done by applying any strong security algorithms so that the data 
cannot be decrypted easily by third party.  Every encryption and decryption process 
will have an assigned public key and private key in which they are only known to the 
authorised party.  
The security features such as public key and digital signatures included in 
MyKad’s PKI enable more secure and protected e-commerce transactions.  
Malaysians whom have converted their old national identity card to MyKad can use 
it as a medium to purchase everyday items, to pre-pay for any services requested and 
to do online transactions with any of the e-commerce merchants using the MyKad’s 
PKI e-commerce application.  Currently, there is still lack of e-commerce 
applications that are compatible with MyKad’s PKI.  Therefore, in the next section 
further discussion on how MyKad’s PKI can be enhanced to support the e-commerce 
application with minimal fuss, the risk and other major considerations that need to be 
considered for the development of MyKad e-commerce applications. 
2.3.2 MyKad’s PKI in e-Commerce Application 
One application that can be looked upon when researching for the success of 
developing MyKad’s PKI in e-commerce application is smart card e-payment.  In 
smart card e-payment, smart cards are used either to store money or enhance e-
payment security.  In many cases, smart cards are more secure than credit cards and 
they can be extended with other payment services (Turban et al., 2008).  For example 
in retail field, smart cards are used where payments are usually done by cash such as 
stores, gas stations, cinemas, transit fares and others.  To use smart cards, it is 
necessary to have smart card reader, a hardware device that communicates with the 
chip on the smart card.  The reader can be attached with, for examples, personal 
computers and electronic cash register.  
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According to Thomas (2004), the benefit of smart card is highly dependent on 
the availability of smart card reader.  Both the customer and the merchant must 
possess the smart card reader.  For instance, Barclay Bank has introduced a card 
reader to its customer since 2007 to perform transactions.  The bank reported that 
almost one million of its customers are using it (Bielski, 1999).  It shows a good 
response since it was launched.  Hence, the user has the control on the validity of 
identification by using the card reader.  Due to that, the use of smart card reader is 
seen as a reason that widens the acceptance of smart card (Chege, 2002). 
2.4 Overview on Electronic Payment  
There are several electronic payment systems and models proposed that depend on 
their application or transaction requirements.  Generally, there are four major 
categories of electronic payment system, which are online credit card payment, 
electronic cash, electronic checks and small payment (Wayner, 1997).  However, 
Meng (2003) classified the electronic payment model into three payment models, 
which are similar to the models proposed by Wayner (1997) except the small 
payment.  Table 2.2 shows the summary of the payment models and Table 2.3 shows 
the comparison of the characteristics of the models. 
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Table 2.2: Summary of reviewed payment models 
Model Description Players 
Electronic 
Credit Card 
1. The payer must have credit card account. 
2. Payer provides credit card account information 
upon paying and sent to merchant bank’s 
processor. 
3. Merchant’s bank sends issuing information to 
the user’s bank.  
4. User’s bank approves/declines the transaction. 
5. User sends the transaction status to the 
merchant’s bank. 
6. Merchant’s bank sends the result to the 
merchant. 
Payer (user),  
Payee (merchant/store), 
Payee’s (merchant/store) bank, 
Payer’s (user) bank. 
 
 
 
Electronic 
Cash  
1. User must purchase the electronic cash from 
the issuer bank.  
2. User uses the electronic cash in data format to 
pay and send to merchant. 
3. Merchant sends the electronic cash to his bank 
for clearing.  
4. Both user and merchant’s bank verify the 
electronic cash.  
5. Bank sends the verified electronic cash to the 
merchant.  
Payer (user),  
Payee (merchant/store), 
Payee’s (merchant/store) bank, 
Electronic cash issuer bank. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Electronic 
Check 
1. User creates an electronic check that includes 
check information. 
2. The signed electronic check is sent to payee.  
3. Payee verifies the signatures and sends the 
payment to the intended account for clearing. 
4. Bank verifies the signature and accounts and 
make sure it is valid and not duplicate.  
5. Bank sent the check to the payee’s account. 
Payer (user),  
Payee (merchant/store), 
Payee’s (merchant/store) bank, 
Payer’s (user) bank. 
Smart Card 
Payment 
1. User loads some money into the smart card.  
2. User inserts card reader to pay for the 
transaction.  
3. Card issuer authenticates the owner.  
4. Merchant fills in the total amount.  
5. Payment is deducted from the user account  
 
User 
Card issuers  
Merchants 
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Table 2.3: Comparison of characteristics of electronic payment model  
Characteristics Electronic 
Credit 
Card 
Electronic 
Cash 
Payment 
Electronic Check 
Payment 
Smart Card 
Payment 
Authority Security 
number + 
PIN 
PIN  Digital Signatures 
+ Digital 
Certificates 
PIN / Digital  
Signatures + 
Digital Certificates 
Actual Pay 
Time 
Later Before Later Pay Before 
User Legitimate 
Credit card 
user 
Anyone Bank Account 
Holder 
Smart Card 
Account / Bank 
Account 
Transaction 
Risk 
Most risks 
are borne by 
bank 
Risk of 
electronic 
cash to be 
stolen, lost 
or misused 
User responsible 
most of the risk, 
however the 
payment can be 
stopped by user 
Risk of smart card 
to be stolen, lost or 
misused. 
Micro Payment No Yes No Yes 
Large Payment Yes No  Yes  Yes 
Transfer 
Limitation 
Depends on 
limit of the 
card 
Depends on 
the prepaid 
No limit Depends on how 
much money is 
saved  
 
Based on both tables, the users of the electronic credit card payment need to 
provide three security numbers at the back of the card and PIN number for 
authorisation.  Electronic cash payment only uses PIN number for authentication.  
Electronic check payment provides strong authentication, which is digital signatures 
and digital certificates.  For time settlement, electronic credit card and electronic 
check payment are paid after the statements are sent to the users while the electronic 
cash is paid before the payment is made because the users need to buy the electronic 
cash before spending it.  
Another characteristic compared is the risk of transaction where the risk of 
electronic check highly depends on the users.  For electronic credit card, bank is 
responsible for most of the risks and the other part for the user.  There is a risk with 
electronic cash if the electronic cash is stolen lost or misused.  Both electronic credit 
card and electronic check do not support micro payment due to high cost of this kind 
of payment.  Because of that, both of them are suitable for macro payment.  On the 
other hand, electronic cash supports micro payment but is not suitable for macro 
payment because if anything happens, the electronic cash is not replaceable.  Users 
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can freely enter any amount of money without limits if they use the electronic check 
while the other two models depend on their card or prepaid limit.  
Because smart card also provides an access to valuable assets or secret 
information such as electronic cash and banking information, they must be secured 
against any threats.  Some smart cards show the account number of the owner and 
some others are required to enter a PIN number that must match the card.  However, 
currently most of the cards use encrypted form to store information in the smart 
cards.  That is why Turban et al. (2008) classified smart cards hacking as “class 3” 
attack because the cost for attacking exceeds the benefit.  
Therefore, to ensure the implementation of MyKad Payment Model (MPM) 
succeeds, the model should be secured and offers good performance in term of time 
such as quick and less authentication time for authorisation.  In order to achieve these 
criteria, the MPM should be developed with the tightest security as it holds critical 
information of the users and the capability to provide shorter waiting time for 
authentication.  Next section discusses further on security. 
2.5 Security Features of Payment Model  
Computer security technology is constantly improved from time to time, as new 
technologies are being introduced almost every day.  However, for all the new 
technologies that are being introduced to the computer world, the obsolete 
technologies are used as reference points.  These obsolete technologies are replaced 
with the new ones.  This can be seen by taking the chronological scenario of mobile 
phone General System of Mobile (GSM) network.  From the Second Generation 
(2G) band that only supports the normal usage of voice call and text message to the 
evolution of multimedia messages that can enclose images and sounds.  Next, Third 
Generation (3G) band that supports video call, internet broadband, and live video 
streaming is introduced.  The evolution of 3G band improves the method of process 
in the 2G band.  Pertinent to the evolution, it is similar to the proposed advanced 
security features of MPM.  In MPM, the most secured safety measures will be 
employed during the authorisation of merchant and certification process.  This 
process will involve a lot of security algorithms to do encryption, decryption and 
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hashing of the transaction.  In order to achieve this requirement, MPM will propose a 
new security feature named Arbitrary Random Switching Algorithm (ARSA), which 
is the evolution and enhanced security of a well-known Microsoft security algorithm 
pack, or CAPICOM.  CAPICOM is a security technology from Microsoft that is used 
as part of this research project. It enables to do digitally signed data with a smart card 
or software key, verifies digitally signed data, graphically displays certificate 
information, and encrypts and decrypts data using public keys and certificates 
(Lambert, 2001).  
Basically, CAPICOM is a library that contains various types of Hashing and 
Encryption/Decryption algorithms.  For encryption process, five different types of 
algorithms are used such as Data Encryption Standard (DES), 3Data Encryption 
Standard (3DES), Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), Rivest Cipher 2 (RC2) and 
Rivest Cipher 4 (RC4), while in hashing Message Digest 2 (MD2), Message Digest 4 
(MD4), Message Digest 5 (MD5) and Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA-1) are used.  
2.5.1 Encryption/Decryption Process 
Encryption is a process of transforming a plaintext to a ciphertext.  In a normal 
context, encryption can be referred to as a football playing strategy.  For example, a 
coach will refer a playing strategy to simple codes such as 4-4-2 strategy or 4-3-3 
strategy, and the players will automatically know that this strategy is devised from 
the details of four defence player, 4 midfielders player and 2 strikers being for the 
former.  Besides, in this strategy, the coach already includes all playing methods 
such as ball wasting, passing mode, tackling mode and others that the players are 
already aware of.  It is important so that when the coach wants to change the 
strategy, he only mentions the simple code to avoid any leak of information to the 
opponent.  
In cryptography, a message in human language referred as plaintext, while 
ciphertext is a message that has been disguised by encryption process.  The main 
reason of encryption is to hide the message or text from anyone for whom it is not 
referred for.  On the other hand, decryption is a process of reversing a ciphertext to 
its original plaintext.  Decryption is a method used to get the original message back 
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from the disguised message.  Encryption and decryption processes need to be 
employed in MPM due to the amount of sensitive data that MPM holds.  MPM holds 
and transmits a lot of sensitive information that can be stolen such as customer 
information and account information.  These data need to be masked before the 
transaction can take place so that, even though it is stolen during the transaction, the 
thief will not be able to use the stolen data because it is encrypted.  So, in order to be 
able to encrypt and decrypt all the data, an algorithm will be used.  This algorithm 
can be referred as a medium and process of encryption and decryption.  Therefore, 
MPM introduces ARSA as its main security feature. 
ARSA is a random switching algorithm technique.  It has the capability to 
randomly switch the algorithms based on time or network attack to the system.  Most 
of the algorithms used in ARSA are either taken directly from the CAPICOM or 
replaced with the newer version that is known to offer the latest security features. 
Like the football strategy, ARSA can be seen like the technique used by the football 
coach during football match.  For example, when the team is in attacking mode, the 
coach will automatically use the attacking technique. When the team is in defence 
mode, the coach will use defence technique. When the game is nearly over and the 
team is winning, the coach will revert to the time wasting technique.  Same goes to 
ARSA of MPM, when the system is being attacked, ARSA will switch to the 
algorithm that is known to be immune to the attack.  All algorithms in ARSA have 
their own strength and weaknesses and the algorithms used in ARSA are specifically 
designed to counter each other’s weaknesses. The details of these algorithms such as 
its history, process, strength and weaknesses will be explained further in the next 
paragraph. 
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Figure 2.3: Encryption and Decryption Processes 
There are two types of encryption process. They are Symmetric and 
Asymmetric Encryptions.  The differences between Symmetric and Asymmetric 
Encryptions are shown in Table 2.4. 
Table 2.4: The differences between Symmetric and Asymmetric Encryptions 
Symmetric Asymmetric 
Private key encryption Public key encryption 
Only one key is used to encrypt/decrypt data Uses public and private keys 
Key should be distributed before transmission 
between entities 
No need to distribute the keys because they are 
already defined as public and private keys. 
The strength depends on the key size. The longer 
the key, the harder to break than the small one. 
Based on mathematical function and 
computationally intensive. 
Examples: DES, 3DES, AES, Blowfish. Examples: RSA and DSA. 
As mentioned earlier in previous section, CAPICOM mainly uses DES, 
3DES, AES, RC2 and RC4 for encryption process.  However, some of the algorithms 
used in CAPICOM have their own weaknesses and they are not suitable to be 
implemented in MPM security module.  
 DES is the first encryption standard to be recommended by National Institute 
Standard Technology (NIST) and it contains 64 bits block size. Based on small key 
size, DES is opened to many attacks and threats that make it an insecure block cipher 
(Stallings, 2005; Coppersmith, 1994).  According to Abuzineh (2004), it is possible 
to crack a DES in less than three and half hours and some experts nowadays no 
longer consider DES to be secure against all attacks and due to that the 3DES is 
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proposed.  However, the entrenchment of DES within the communities such as 
banking will make it difficult to switch to a different encryption algorithm even if 
NIST does not recertify DES (Scheneir, 1994).  
 3DES is the improvement from weakness of the DES.  This algorithm was 
proposed as a replacement for DES due to the advances in key searching (Nadeem & 
Javed, 2005).  It is a 64 bits block size but with 192 bits key size, which is three 
times higher than DES.  It is applied three times from DES encryption algorithm to 
increase the encryption level and the average safe time (Elminaam et al., 2008).  
However, because it applies three times, 3DES is known as slower than other block 
cipher method (Stallings, 2005) but it is more secure if used properly. 
 AES became the U.S Government standard in 2002 and has been approved 
for use with classified information.  AES was proposed because clearly a 
replacement for DES was needed at that time (NIST, 1997).  AES encryption is fast 
and flexible and can be implemented on various platforms especially in small devices 
(Naik & Wei, 2001).  In addition, AES has been carefully tested for many security 
applications (Stallings, 2005; Daemen & Rijmen, 2001).  The known attacks against 
AES to date have involved timing, where the keys are guessed by analysing how 
long particular steps require.  Some cryptographers worry that there might be attacks 
on the algorithm itself, but none have publicly emerged to date.  Moreover, in terms 
of power consumption and throughput, AES has an advantage over 3DES, DES and 
RC2 (Elminaam et al., 2008). 
 RC2 and RC4 were invented by Ronald Rivest for RSA Data Security, Inc. 
RC2 is known to have two weaknesses that are vulnerable to differential attacks 
related to key attack (Elbaz & Bar-El, 2000).  A study also showed that RC2 still has 
low performance among of these algorithms.  On the other hand, the disadvantage of 
RC4 is the weak key-mixing phase.  Obviously, 1 over 256 of the keys belongs to a 
class of weak keys and they are detectable.  Based on the algorithms above, only two 
algorithms are selected in ARSA library, which are 3DES and AES.  The other three 
algorithms will be replaced with the latest algorithms, which are RC6, Blowfish and 
Rivest Shamir Adleman (RSA).  
Due to the weaknesses of RC2 and RC4, RC6 is implemented.  RC6 is 
considered to be strong algorithm with fast and easy hardware implementation. 
Moreover, in MPM system, MyKad reader is required.  In addition, the advantage of 
RC6 is that this algorithm is quite simple and will allow a compiler to produce well-
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optimised code resulting in good performance without hand optimisations (Rivest et 
al., 2000).  A study done by Elminaam et al. (2008) also showed that RC6 required 
less time than all algorithms, except Blowfish. 
As a replacement for the DES algorithm, Blowfish is applied.  Blowfish takes 
a variable length key, ranging from 32 bits to 448 bits and it consumes a lot of time 
to break.  The Blowfish is designed to resist all known attacks on block cipher and it 
is known for its security and availability in common encryption products (Elbaz & 
Bar-El, 2000).  In performance simulation done by Elminaam et al. (2008), it was 
also concluded that Blowfish has a better performance than other common 
encryption algorithms used, followed by RC6.  
As stated earlier, one of the basic requirements in MyKad is the minimum of 
RSA 1024 bits processor.  For that, RSA scheme is implemented in ARSA library. 
RSA algorithm is based on the factoring of very large prime numbers and demand as 
the easiest public key algorithm that works for encryption.  The advantage of RSA 
comes from the fact that, while it is easy to multiply two huge prime numbers 
together to obtain the product, it is computationally difficult to do the reverse.  RSA 
is still the most widely used encryption algorithm.  However, while other standards 
such as DES are faster to decrypt, RSA remains as an industry-favourite for 
encrypting data with many believing its 2048 bit key encryption is virtually 
unbreakable.  This is because factoring is such a slow process, and because of this 
combination of the slowness of factoring and an asymmetric encryption process, that 
make RSA so powerful and revolutionary compared to previous systems of 
encryption.  Below is the general algorithm encryption step: 
(i) Plain text is ready to be converted (plain text here is any information 
 that needs to be transmitted). 
(ii) Plain text is converted by the algorithm to mask its original 
 information. 
  General algorithm key is used here. 
(iii)     The masked data is transmitted. 
(iv) Receiver will decrypt the masked data using the same algorithm to 
 reveal  the original information. 
